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The role of marketing in quality bus corridor promotion
T. Rye and M. Enoch
Quality bus corridors (QBCs) are being implemented in
towns and cities throughout the British Isles in order to
improve the image of the bus and to boost patronage, with
a view to meeting local and national transport policy
objectives such as reduced reliance on the private car.
QBC initiatives commonly consist of bus priority
measures, improved vehicles, enhanced waiting
environments, better information and, sometimes,
enhanced service frequencies. The purpose of this paper is
to examine the importance of the marketing of the QBC
concept to the achievement of its objectives: are
infrastructure and services sufficient, or will careful
marketing increase awareness of the QBC and hence its
overall effectiveness? To answer this question, the paper
considers empirical experience of QBC implementation in
one smaller and two larger urban areas in Britain—with its
largely deregulated bus system—and the Republic of
Ireland. Based on interview data from local authorities and
operators, and on other unpublished information,
comparisons are drawn between the QBC experience in
Perth and Edinburgh in Scotland andDublin in Ireland. The
British examples are of interest because of their creation
of an overall image for bus travel—through Greenways in
Edinburgh, and Kick Start in Perth. Their Irish comparator
has invested in vehicles and infrastructure, with less
attention paid to the overall image of theQBCs. The paper
will assess whether or not this is important.
1. INTRODUCTION: OBJECTIVES AND STRUCTURE
OF PAPER
This paper addresses the importance of marketing in the overall
effectiveness of quality bus corridors (QBCs). Local authorities
and bus operators are aiming to increase bus ridership and win
market share from their principal competitor, the private car. To
do this, a range of measures are generally implemented to
improve bus services: infrastructure such as bus lanes and better
stops, improved frequencies and vehicles, and simplified fares
and timetables. This paper explores the degree to which QBC
implementation in two EU countries has included marketing of
the concept in order to increase its impact; and it attempts to
assess the importance of marketing, relative to other more
infrastructure- and service-based improvements—insofar as these
can be disentangled. (Note: Marketing is directly concerned with
the selling of goods or services. In the public transport field,
marketing activities are those directly concerned with the selling
of public transport services or journeys. These might include
improving the product by simplifying the route network,
providing better information, conducting market research, or
targeting specific user groups with promotions.)
To achieve the above aims, the paper first defines the range of
improvements that can be implemented to grow the bus market.
It then defines QBCs and marketing, before moving on to
consider three empirical examples. Two of these are from
Scotland—Stagecoach’s Kick Start experiment in Perth, and
Lothian Buses and its use of Greenways in Edinburgh. The third is
from a different regulatory environment, but one with many
institutional similarities to Britain: Dublin and its QBCs, in the
Republic of Ireland. The paper compares the success of these
initiatives and attempts to isolate the impact of marketing from
other measures, thus drawing conclusions that are relevant to
policy elsewhere in the British Isles.
2. DEFINITIONS
There are a range of measures that bus operators and local
authorities can take to improve bus services. Previous work by
the TAS Partnership1 has shown that on average these measures
result in quite different levels of return on investment. It appears
that the ‘soft’ measures related to the nature of the service and the
way that it is marketed are, in the short to medium term at least,
more cost-effective than ‘harder’ infrastructure investment in
terms of return per pound expended (see Table 1). This analysis
does not of course address the issue of whether, if the
improvements are all implemented together, there is a cumulative
impact beyond the individual cost-effectiveness figures shown in
Table 1.
It has been argued elsewhere2 that the bus industry has, until
recently at least, nonetheless displayed a tendency to address the
less cost-effective measures. This is ascribed to a continuing
public sector/local authority ethos in the industry, coupled with
a greater interest among company managers in vehicles than in
the service itself. Local authorities in Britain outside London are
of course unable to influence the nature and branding of the
services themselves, although many play a role in the provision
of information.
3. QBCS AND THEIR IMPACTS
Quality bus corridors have been introduced in many parts of
Britain over the past six to seven years. They have generally been
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promoted by local authorities, working in collaboration with the
bus operators on the corridors concerned. Consequently, much
emphasis has been placed in QBC initiatives on the infrastructure
aspects of the corridor. They have been used in order to provide
priority for buses, and also to carry out traffic management works
that have benefited all road users. These include junction
improvements, new pedestrian crossings and junction entry
treatments, and the rationalisation of on-street parking controls.
The degree to which QBCs include bus priority varies widely,
depending on constraints of local politics as well as the
experience and attitudes of the traffic engineers and transport
planners who design them. At one extreme, a QBC may include
bus lanes wherever there is room to fit them in; at the other, an
authority that is particularly afraid of adverse reaction from local
traders and residents who fear the loss of on-street parking may
simply upgrade bus stops, install bus priority at traffic signals,
implement a bus lane where (and if) there are no other
competing uses for the road space, and refer to this as a quality
bus corridor.
In addition, some QBCs have seen the introduction of real-time
bus information and better paper-based information, as well as
(in some cases) improved bus service frequencies and newer
buses. The emphasis which QBCs have placed on marketing the
bus services that use them has been variable, due to the fact
that this element is highly dependent on the attitude of the
local management of the bus company (or companies) in
the area.
In ridership terms, QBCs have achieved some impressive
results. Three oft-quoted bus Quality Partnerships are found in
the West Midlands. Known as ‘Showcase’ routes, Line 33
between Birmingham city centre, Kingstanding and Pheasey,
Superline linking Coventry city centre and Foleshill, and
Primeline connecting Walsall and Bloxwich, began operating
in February 1997, June 1998 and August 1998 respectively.
Patronage growth has been impressive: Line 33 up 28%,
Superline up 18%, and Primeline up 5% since their
introduction.
4. MARKETING AND ITS IMPACTS
It has been shown that the most innovative bus companies in
Britain—among them, Trent Barton and Brighton and Hove—have
achieved year-on-year increases in patronage of 5–7% by
adopting strategies based around a clear brand, innovative
marketing, simple fares, networks and service frequencies,
together with elements such as driver training and (in the case of
Trent Barton), money-back guarantees. Simplification of whole
networks in such cities as Glasgow, Leeds, Bradford, Bristol and
Plymouth has reversed previous declines in patronage—by over
10% in Glasgow since 1998/99, for example. This has delivered
improved services to the core market, although concentration of
services on main routes and corridors has left some areas without
any commercial service at all. The ‘marketing approach’—one of
creating a network worthy of being marketed, and then actively
marketing it—has, however, shown itself able to maintain the
viability of previously contracting networks, in the short term
at least.
5. EMPIRICAL EXPERIENCE AND OBSERVATIONS
5.1. Perth, Scotland
This section is drawn from the Stagecoach publication Kickstart,3
which describes an experiment in bus marketing undertaken
by the company in its operation in this medium-sized Scottish
city.
Stagecoach identified a poor-performing, low-frequency bus
route as a candidate for the Kick Start approach. The route had a
profile of aged owner-occupiers with high car dependency. Perth
and Kinross Council was about to introduce a bus priority scheme
on the route, the first major use of such a scheme in the city.
Further complementary local authority measures included new
bus shelters and transponders to give buses priority at traffic-
light-controlled junctions.
Stagecoach supported these steps by
(a) doubling the frequency of the bus service and introducing
low-floor buses, although there was no business case in
terms of historic profitability and the additional cost
involved
(b) rezoning fares to make them simple and more
understandable, resulting in a number of sizeable fare
reductions
(c) devising and implementing a detailed marketing strategy
(d) distributing launch publicity and direct marketing to
householders
(e) undertaking follow-up door-to-door interviews with
potential customers, including a discussion of the
Government’s environmental targets, the new bus lanes and
Stagecoach’s new service
( f ) offering free trips to prospective customers
(g) launching a programme of on-bus marketing, children’s
competitions, pensioners’ lunches and other promotions.
In year 2 of the project, non-users were targeted through a
tailored direct marketing campaign to offer the bus as a transport
mode of choice. The results of the project were
(a) passenger growth of 56% on the service for the first two
years
(b) forecast of 63% cumulative growth over a three-year period
(c) modal shift from private car to bus
(d) break-even point forecast for year 4, following a pattern of
improved financial results: from a loss of £120 000 in year 2
to a £43 000 loss in year 3.
For more detailed figures see Reference 4.
Measure
Approximate return per
pound spent: £
Service simplification 3.50
Effective service promotion and
branding
3.10
High-quality signage and information 2.80
Bus stop improvements 2.20
New buses 1.80
Bus priority measures such as bus
lanes and signal priority
1.60
Real-time passenger information/
automatic vehicle location equipment
1.20
Table 1. Return per £1 of expenditure
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Revenue growth over the period has matched pricing as fares
returned to original levels, with no elasticity observed. On the
basis of primary research undertaken in Perth, new users in the
city are less price-sensitive than in other areas of the UK.
Market research undertaken in Perth nine months into the project
showed
(a) high user satisfaction levels of 89%, significantly better than
the Department of Transport, Local Government and the
Regions (DTLR) Quality Indicators Report,5 which recorded
average overall satisfaction levels of 79% across the UK
(b) positive perception of the service by existing non-users,
with 46% stating they would ‘definitely’ or ‘very likely’
use the Stagecoach service within the next few months.
Using this information, Stagecoach tailored a telephone-based
direct marketing campaign specifically targeted at these non-
users to persuade them to travel by bus. This resulted in the
conversion of 8% of those in the contact database to public
transport and latterly feedback from these new customers has
been very positive.
In this example then, it is clear that many elements that fall under
the category of marketing have been very important in bringing
about the more than 50% increase in ridership. In particular, the
route has been simplified, frequency increased, fares reduced and
targeted marketing carried out. Bus priority was also installed but
was quite modest in its extent compared with the other two
examples examined in this paper; it consists of a few short
lengths of bus lane together with improvements to bus stops, and
some traffic management measures. One can infer, then, that the
marketing elements (including service frequency increase) had a
more significant impact on ridership than did the infrastructure,
but it is difficult to disentangle the precise levels of influence of
each. It should also be noted that the results of the Perth trial have
not been evaluated independently, and that the company may be
seeking to place the best possible ‘spin’ on its experience, in order
to attract public-sector funding for further Kick Start type
projects.
5.2. Edinburgh
Edinburgh, the capital of Scotland, is a city of 460 000 people
surrounded by other towns that bring the regional population to
almost 900 000. It continues to enjoy economic success and
consequently its transport system is under considerable stress.
Due to its generally poor urban road infrastructure, limited city-
centre parking, outlying social housing schemes and its high-
density core and inner suburbs, bus ridership in Edinburgh
remains at about 200 trips per person per year, the highest in the
UK outside London, making it a very strong bus market. Within
the City of Edinburgh, fully 97% of bus services are commercial,
although many of the longer-distance services into the city
require subsidy.
The dominant bus operator in Edinburgh is Lothian Buses, with
550 vehicles running 19.5 million vehicle miles of service
annually and carrying annual ridership of 91.5 million
passengers. The direct descendant of the municipal tram
company, it is one of the few UK bus operators that has not been
privatised: it remains owned by four local authorities in the
region, but it must operate as a public limited company without
any direct control or subsidy from government. However, its
owners are willing to accept a lower profit on turnover—about
12%—than they would if it were owned by one of the major bus
groups. It can be argued that this allows Lothian to run more
services and to set lower fares than it would be able to if it were a
stock market listed bus company required to return about 15% on
turnover.6
Edinburgh’s other major bus operator is First Edinburgh
(formerly SMT), a unit of First Group, running approximately 260
vehicles in the area. Since deregulation, First/SMT and Lothian
have had periodic bouts of on-road competition, such as in 2001/
02 when First registered several services that had traditionally
been run by Lothian. Generally, however, on-road competition
has been limited to one or two routes, and the two operators have
generally operated in geographically distinct areas: Lothian in
the city and SMT/First to the outlying towns.
Greenways were introduced in 1997 as part of Edinburgh City
Council’s Moving Forward transportation strategy. The
Greenways concept involved the phased introduction of 26 km of
bus lanes on five routes in the city, representing a threefold
increase on existing provision. Phase 1 comprised the
implementation of measures on the A8 and A900 corridors, while
Phase 2 added a further three routes which were opened in late
1998. They were an early example of the QBC concept, including
the following measures.
(a) Bus lanes, surfaced in green, wherever road width permitted
(i.e. not only in areas where congestion is a regular
problem). This was to provide a clear message that this road
space is reserved for buses and, indeed, anecdotally at least,
many drivers appear to be under the impression that no
driving is permitted in Greenways at any time of the day or
night. In this sense, a strong image or brand was created for
the Greenway, such that other non-Greenway bus priority
(i.e. that not defined by a special Greenway Traffic
Regulation Order) that has been installed since 1998 is also
referred to as a Greenway by many people.
(b) In narrower sections of the road, red-surfaced advisory cycle
lanes were installed.
(c) A new parking and loading regime, similar to that on
London’s Red Routes. This means, in effect, that on most
parts of the Greenways, parking is not permitted between
0730 and 1830 Monday to Saturday, but loading is
permitted in the interpeak. As noted above, this regime is
defined by a special Traffic Regulation Order, and
enforcement of parked as well as moving vehicles is the task
of police traffic wardens rather than the council’s parking
attendants, who are confined to non-Greenway routes.
(d) Improvements to stops, shelters and timetable information
at stops.
(e) Improved junction layouts, traffic calming to deter rat
running round key junctions, and entry treatments of
side-road junctions to improve conditions for pedestrians.
At the time of the introduction of the Greenways, there were no
changes to bus services or additional marketing of the service by
the main operator in Edinburgh, Lothian Buses.
A study of the effectiveness of Greenways by consultant Colin
Buchanan and Partners for the Scottish Executive7 found that, in
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comparison with a route where ‘conventional’ bus priority was in
operation, Greenways made a significant contribution to
improved service reliability. This was due mainly to improved
compliance by drivers and people parking on the Greenway
compared with the conventional bus lanes, which was itself a
result of higher levels of enforcement on the former routes. From
an analysis of ticket machine data from one bus service that uses
both the conventional bus priority and the Greenways, there was
also evidence of a growth in patronage of 2% overall. This
average masked increases in the peak hour of between 7% and
15% on different parts of the route. However, patronage growth
was not confined merely to those parts of the route using the
Greenway.
In 1998 a new management team was selected to change the
perception of Lothian Buses as a very well-run but slightly staid
company. This they did by investing in new buses (some 170
low-floor double-deckers since 1999, at a cost of £21 million, the
latest with attractive tartan upholstery) and, crucially,
rationalising their network. This strategy involved unifying
low-frequency services running on virtually the same route to
form one easily comprehended high-frequency route. Fares were
also simplified (and reduced by about 15% for longer trips), and a
new off-peak day ticket was introduced. Since then, partly with
the financial assistance of a new city-centre leisure complex, a
revamped night bus network has been introduced, such that the
most heavily-used services run on a 24-hour basis, at frequencies
of up to four buses per hour.
New major trip generators—particularly a very large shopping
centre/employment area to the west of the city, and also the
administrative HQ of the new Scottish Government in the north of
the city—were much better served. All bus stops now offer details
of bus times, destinations served, and fares—sadly, innovative by
UK standards. A new livery was adopted for Lothian’s new buses,
in an attempt to create a more modern brand, which is carried
through to all marketing literature. Smartcards have been
introduced for season-ticket holders, who can now purchase
passes by direct debit. Bus-kilometres have increased by 10%
and, while key services are operated by new high-quality buses,
Lothian has also invested in some 20 second-hand Leyland
National buses to run on its secondary services.
After the implementation of these changes, patronage on Lothian
Buses began to rise, reversing the trend of continual decline that
had been apparent since the 1950s. Total bus passenger boardings
in the former Lothian Regional Council area (which is dominated
by Lothian buses passengers in numerical terms) increased from
98 million in 1998/99 to 114 million in 2001/02.8,9 This rise
of almost 15% can be ascribed to the following four main
factors—although their individual importance is almost
impossible to disentangle
(a) the changes in Lothian Buses’ operation, fares and
marketing over the past three years, as described above
(b) the city council’s introduction of bus priority on Greenways
and, since then, on other routes
(c) the city council’s long-standing restraint-based parking
policy in the central area of the city (although this did not
become any more restraint-based in the period 1998–2002)
(d) a continuing increase in employment in Edinburgh,
including in the city centre, and a decline in surrounding
areas, leading to longer-distance commuting, some of it
by bus.
5.3. Dublin
During the 1990s, with economic growth of around 10% per year,
Dublin was facing worsening levels of traffic congestion. This led
in 1994 to the publication of the Dublin Transportation
Initiative10—the first integrated study of transport in the
city—which in turn resulted in a virtual halt to urban road
building (although the C-ring, the M50 motorway around the city
was given the go-ahead), three LRT lines (now two) and a number
of so-called QBCs—eleven radial, and one orbital.
The goal of the QBC is ‘to provide a clearly defined, high
performance bus transportation system segregated from other
traffic’.11 In practical terms, the aim is to deliver bus journey
speeds on the corridor of at least 20 km/h, with a minimum
increase in bus journey speeds of 25% on all corridors; in
addition, buses must be segregated from other traffic along the
complete length of the corridor, except where the road width is
too narrow to provide a bus lane. Further, it is aimed to provide
high-quality waiting areas with real-time passenger information
throughout, while buses will have an average age of only five
years, be accessible to mobility-impaired people, be distinct in
appearance from other buses and be air-conditioned. Finally,
average waiting times for passengers were set at 3 min during the
peak and 4 min in the off-peak, with an average excess wait of
2 min allowed. According to a representative of Dublin Bus,
peak-hour bus frequencies are as high as one bus every 35–40 s
on the Malahide Road corridor, and average 90 s across the QBCs
as a whole—but off-peak frequencies are closer to one bus every
10 min. Being able to deliver a very highly peaked service such as
this requires subsidy: Dublin Bus’ Annual Report 200212 shows
that approximately 25% of its total income was made up of
government grant (excluding one-off grants to buy new buses).
The comparable figure for Lothian Buses in Edinburgh is
approximately 12%, including tendered service support and a bus
service operating grant (BSOG) (formerly fuel duty rebate).
As of late 2002, 98 km of bus lanes forming nine QBCs are in
place, and three remain to be developed, namely Orbital, South
Clondalkin and Ballymun. The results are impressive. In total, bus
use in the morning peak (0700–0915 Monday to Friday) inbound
services have increased by 38%, from 138 500 to 191 500
passengers since 1997, while on the Stillorgan QBC, patronage
rose by 232%. Further, cordon counts on the ‘canal ring’ of traffic
entering the city show that the modal share of the bus increased
from 36.8% in 1997 to 40.5% in 2001. These counts also showed
that some 60–65% of new bus users had switched from the car.
Altogether, QBC implementation costs are around C– 57 million
for 98 km, or C– 575 000 per km. While installing the lanes was
relatively cheap, the cost of providing traffic signal
improvements, additional cycle lanes and a whole raft of ‘village
improvements’—necessary for gaining local approval of the
process—was significantly higher. The QBCs were mainly funded
through European Regional Development Funding and Traffic
Management Grants from the Dublin Transportation Office, the
regional transport and planning authority (Dublin Bus, personal
communication, 2002; and Reference 11).
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The QBC concept in Dublin has brought to passengers the
following
(a) much reduced journey time and much increased reliability,
thanks to increased numbers of buses as well as route-length
bus priority
(b) newer buses
(c) improved stops.
However, in comparison with the marketing approach to bus
services outlined in this second section of the paper, bus services
in Dublin have not benefited from
(a) consistent route branding (route branding using the
‘Cityswift’ brand was attempted, but was unable to be
maintained)
(b) more consistent provision of high-quality information
(c) money-back guarantees
(d) route and fare simplification
(e) any novel marketing techniques, such as targeting
particular groups of potential passengers, although leaflet
drops to the local area were carried out before the launch of
each QBC scheme.
Nonetheless, the increases in passenger numbers on the corridors
concerned cited by Dublin Bus and Dublin Transportation Office
for QBCs in Dublin appear to surpass any large-scale experience
of investment in bus infrastructure and services in Britain outside
London—although the Kick Start experiment in Perth has
achieved more impressive results in terms of percentage growth
rates, albeit only on one route. This is in spite of a lack of any
significant marketing elements in Dublin’s bus strategy. This may
suggest that the key to significant increases in bus patronage, and
to modal shift from car to bus, is to install route-length bus
priority and to increase frequencies to one bus every 2 min or
better. However, there are also specific factors that may help to
explain the particularly spectacular increase in ridership on
Dublin’s QBCs (if not on the Dublin network overall). These are all
related to the city’s high rate of economic growth, which may
have brought about
(a) a dramatic increase in the number of cars on the road with a
corresponding almost overnight deterioration in traffic
congestion and pressure on parking, which may act as more
of a stimulus to modal shift than do incremental changes
(b) a high degree of churn in the labour market—people change
job frequently and thus reconsider their choice of mode for
the journey to work more frequently than in more stable
labour markets
(c) an influx of new labour, and hence demand for the bus.
A final point is that while no significant deliberate effort has been
made to introduce ‘marketing’ as part of the Dublin QBCs, and the
infrastructure and service aspects are in themselves so strong as
to make the impacts of any marketing difficult to discern, the
QBCs did benefit significantly from free—if not entirely positive—
publicity generated by the controversy that surrounded their
introduction.
Measure Perth Edinburgh Dublin
Bus lanes Limited, very short lengths close
to junctions; special vehicle
detection (SVD) at signals
Full-length lanes wherever physically
possible; special vehicle detection
(SVD) at signals
Full-length lanes wherever
physically possible
Bus stops Boarders and shelters Boarders and shelters Improved shelters
Vehicles More modern vehicles, low
floor
Investment in new vehicles but not
coincident in time with
introduction of bus priority
New double-deckers
Frequency Doubled to 4 bph Frequencies not increased but
services simplified
Increased to every 90 s in peak
Routes Concerns only one route Simplification and some
rationalisation to main corridors
Services concentrated to use
corridors but still relatively
complex
Ticketing Simplified fares Simplified fares structure, exact fare
only, daily and longer-period
tickets available
Zone fares, poorly explained. Exact
fare only. Passes available
Branding Yes Attempted but not maintained Attempted but not maintained
Information Direct marketing to households
along route
Comprehensive timing, fares and
route information from each stop
Poor at stops
Leaflets Yes, considerable targeted
marketing
Local area at launch of bus priority,
plus wider distribution—ongoing
Local area only at launch
Economic activity Buoyant Rapid growth Rapid growth
Congestion Low levels of congestion Deterioration in suburbs; static in
city centre
Deterioration
Parking Very low parking prices in city
centre (c. 25p per hour)
Small real-terms increases in
on-street parking charges
1998–2004
Harder to find and more expensive
Impact on
ridership
56% increase in first two years 15% rise in passengers network-
wide, 1998/99 to 2001/02
9% rise in passengers network-
wide, 1998/99 to 2001/02; 38%
increase on QBCs in am peak,
1997–2002. Modal shift from car
Table 2. Comparison of measures—Perth, Edinburgh, Dublin
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6. SUMMARYAND CONCLUSIONS
By way of conclusion, Table 2 compares the measures introduced
in the three case study cities. The empirical examples presented
in this paper cannot easily disentangle the respective influences
of the marketing approach, compared with the introduction of
QBC infrastructure alone. The Scottish and other British examples
appear to highlight the importance of the former, while the case
of QBCs Dublin to an extent demonstrates the opposite—at the
route level, at least. However, the network-wide effects are
somewhat different. Dublin Bus enjoyed a total increase in
patronage of 9% between 1998 and 2002,13 compared with the
15% seen in the former Lothian Region (which is dominated by
Lothian Buses). Even the Trent Barton and Brighton and Hove
networks, which have not benefited from extensive bus priority,
have demonstrated higher rates of passenger growth than has
Dublin Bus. The ‘marketing approach’ appears, from these
examples, therefore, to be more effective than the infrastructure
approach, at the network level. From a policy point of view, the
final conclusion is perhaps the most self-evident: that, for
maximum effect, both should be done together.
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